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however, noted that it "is settled law in Montana" that the owner of a riverbed
does not have the right to exclude the public from utilizing the riverbed of nonnavigable waters and banks up to the high water mark. Therefore, the Court
held that since Kennedy never had the right to control access to the water he
had "no compensable interest" in the property he claims was taken.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that allowing public
access to the Ruby River did not constitute an unconstitutional taking. The
Court, however, reversed the trial court on all other issues and remanded the
case to the trial court to determine the definite singular width of the Seyler Lane
public right-of-way.
Kobi Webb
Skelton Ranch, Inc. v. Pondera Cnty. Canal &Reservoir Co., 328 P.3d 644
(Mont. 2014) (holding that the water court (i) properly admitted historical documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, pursuant to the ancient documents
exception to the hearsay rule; (ii) correctly rejected the Water Master's findings
as to the capacity of a flume on the Thomas ditch and did not improperly substitute its own view of the evidence; (iii) correctly determined that the claimants'
predecessors abandoned or never perfected portions of the claimants' water
rights; and (iv) correctly concluded that the claimants did not acquire any water
rights by adverse possession).
Claimants Gregory Duncan, Sherri Donovan, Terry Dougherty (collectively "Duncan") and Skelton Angus Ranch, Inc. ("Skelton") filed statements of
claim for existing water rights based on notices of appropriation ("NOAs") filed
between 1895 and 1913. These claims shared a single point of diversion from
the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek in the Two Medicine River Basin, from
which the water flowed through the Thomas ditch and into both Duncan and
Skelton's land. Pondera County Canal and Reservoir Company ("Pondera")
filed a notice of intent to appear in the adjudication of Skelton and Duncan's
claims; Pondera also diverted water from the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek
through the Thomas ditch. Following a hearing, the Water Master ("Master")
quantified and assigned priority dates to the claimed water rights. The Montana
Water Court ("water court") amended and then adopted the Master's Report
("Report") as amended. Duncan and Skelton then appealed the decision of the
water court to the Supreme Court of Montana ("Court").
The Court considered four issues on appeal. First, the Court addressed
whether the water court properly admitted documents that Pondera produced
in the early 1900s documenting the water rights in the area. Pondera originally
prepared these documents in order to determine the viability of obtaining land
under the federal Carey Land Act. Duncan and Skelton argued that the documents were self-serving hearsay evidence prepared in anticipation of litigation
and that Pondera had a motive for misrepresentation when the documents were
created. The Court held that the statements were properly admitted under the
ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule. The Court defined an ancient
document as "a document in existence for twenty years or more, the authenticity
of which is established." In this case, Duncan and Skelton conceded that the
documents were in existence for over twenty years and were authentic. Addi-
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tionally, the Court noted that the Master found that the documents had "sufficient circumstantial indicia and trustworthiness for admission," and that both
the Master and the water court acknowledged the scarcity of purely objective
data concerning the water lights at issue.
Second, the Court addressed whether the water court correctly rejected the
Master's findings regarding certain variables used to determine the historical
capacity of the Thomas ditch flume ("flume"). The flume was originally built
in 1912 after the Thomas ditch washed out in 1908. In 1931 the flume was
rebuilt to a size significantly larger than the 1912 flume. In his Report, the
Master concluded that certain water rights were limited to the capacity of the
1912 flume, and the construction of the 1931 flume resulted in the creation of
new "implied" water rights to be distributed among the parties.
The Master then performed independent calculations to determine the
flow rates for both the 1912 flume and the 1931 flume. The flow rates that
resulted from these calculations were much higher than the estimated flow rates
submitted by the parties' expert witnesses. The water court rejected the Master's findings concerning the capacity of the 1912 flume because the Master
used the slope measurement from the 1912 flume but based the overall dimensions on a 1920 flume structure. The water court also rejected the Master's
findings concerning the capacity of the 1931 flume, holding that the Master
committed clear error by relying on Manning's formula, which depends heavily
on slope, when the factual record contained no slope measurement for the 1931
flume.
The water court relied on testimony from die parties' experts when calculating the 1912 flume's capacity. The testimony of the parties' experts revealed
that the maximum capacity of the 1912 flume was likely 4.6 cubic feet per second (cfs). The water court then determined that because the flume did not
carry its maximum capacity at all times, the right should be limited to 4.5 cfs.
The water court avoided using Manning's formula when calculating the capacity
of the 1931 flume, instead relying on the expert witnesses' calculations for an
inlet-controlled structure and concluding that the flume's capacity was twenty
cfs. The Court held that the water court correctly determined that the Master
committed clear error when calculating the flume's capacities. The Court also
held that the water court did not substitute its own view of the evidence for the
Master's because the evidence did not support the Master's findings.
Third, the Court addressed whether the water court correctly determined
that portions of Duncan and Skelton's water rights had been abandoned or
never perfected. Duncan and Skelton claimed additional water rights under
1895, 1902, and 1913 NOAs. The Master determined that Duncan and Skelton's predecessors abandoned these additional water rights because of the
flume's limited capacity. The water court held that Duncan and Skelton never
had rights to the 1895 claim and adopted the Master's finding that the Duncan
and Skelton's predecessors had abandoned the 1902 and 1913 water rights.
Duncan and Skelton argued that their predecessors perfected the 1895 right in
the original ditch that washed out and that their predecessors lacked the requisite intent to abandon the other rights.
Addressing the 1895 NOA, the Court concluded that the water court correctly held that neither Duncan nor Skelton had perfected the 1895 NOA. The
Court noted that Skelton owned none of the lands mentioned in the 1895
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NOA, and that the lands that Duncan owned that were subject to the 1895
NOA reflected a chain of title that did not reference the 1895 NOA. Accordingly, both Duncan and Skelton lacked the requisite contractual relationship
with the original appropriator.
The Court then addressed the 1902 and 1913 NOAs and held that the
water court was correct in finding that Duncan and Skelton abandoned any water they claimed to have used that exceeded the flume's capacity. The Court
reasoned that the flume's capacity limited the amount of water available for beneficial use for eighteen to twenty-nine years, a period of time sufficient to raise
a presumption of abandonment. Duncan and Skelton argued that their predecessors' continuous struggle to repair and expand the original flume demonstrated an intention to maintain the rights. The Court found this unpersuasive,
holding that those efforts merely signaled an intention to continue to.use the
amount of water carried by the original 1912 flume. Accordingly, the Court
held that the Master and water court did not err in finding the claimed water in
excess of the flume's capacity abandoned.
Finally, the Court addressed whether the water court correctly adopted the
Master's conclusion that neither Duncan nor Skelton acquired any water rights
by adverse possession. Duncan and Skelton argued that if they did lose their
interest in the 1895 appropriation, they or their predecessors reacquired ownership of that right through adverse possession. The Court stated that in order
for Duncan or Skelton to prove adverse use, they had to provide evidence that
they or their predecessors used the water "at a time when the owner of the right
to use the water had need of it, used it in such a substantial manner as to notify
the owner that it was being deprived of water to which it was entitled; and that
during all of that period, the owner could have maintained an action against him
for so using the water."
The Master determined that Skelton was not entitled to any portion of the
1895 appropriation based on adverse possession because Duncan's predecessors, as upstream users, used all of the water right carried in the 1912 flume
before Skelton could attempt to use it. The Master then determined that Duncan did not provide sufficient evidence to support an adverse possession of either the 1895 or 1902 appropriations. The Court therefore agreed with the
Master's deternination that neither Duncan nor Skelton were entitled to claim
any water from the 1895 appropriation based on adverse possession.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's opinion on all four issues
raised by the claimants.
Brock Miller
NEBRASKA
Joe McClaren Ranch, L.L.C. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. (Inre 2007 Admin.
of Waters of the Niobrara River), 851 N.W.2d 640 (Neb. 2014) (holding that:
(i) the legislative history of the statutes governing the Nebraska Department of
Natural Resources' water right cancellation procedures was not relevant to the
issues of common law abandonment or statutory forfeiture, but its improper
admission was harmless; (ii) NPPD's failure to call for administration of the
Niobrara River prior to 2007 was not evidence of an intent to abandon its water

